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THE ADOPTION OF THE MULTIDIVISIONAL FORM OF
ORGANIZATION: A CONTINGENCY MODEL
This paper examines the proposition that the multidivisional
structure is determined by both power and efficiency imperatives.
It is theorized that combining the coalitional power and
information-processing perspectives of organizational choice
enables us to explain and predict organizational form. The
theory is tested on 291 Fortune 500 firms. The results largely
confirm theoretical expectations. It is submitted that the
multidivisional paradigm illustrates the central premises of the
paper: (1) a synthesis of efficiency and power perspectives is a
viable research program; and (2) theoretical pluralism increases
empirical content and should be valued by those concerned with
progress in the emerging field of strategic management.

THE ADOPTION OF MULTIDIVISIONAL FORM OF
ORGANIZATION: A CONTINGENCY MODEL
INTRODUCTION
The decentralized multidivisional form of corporate
organization may well have been "American capitalism's most
important single innovation of the twentieth century"
(Williamson, 1971, p. 382). A stream of research in strategic
management has considered the adoption of the multidivisional (M-
form) as an adaptive response to the problems of bounded
rationality (March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1976). An
information-processing imperative, and opportunism of
organizational members (Anderson, 1988) where control and
auditing systems are inadeguate to mitigate the agency problem of
the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932;
Williamson, 1975) necessitates an organizational response.
A second stream of research has considered organizational
decisions from a coalitional power perspective (Cyert and March,
1963; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1982). While many
researchers advocate combining the efficiency and power
frameworks (Goldberg, 1980; Jemison, 1981; Lindblom, 1977; Ulrich
and Barney, 1984) there has been little empirical work (with the
notable exception of Palmer, Friedland, Jennings and Powers,
1987) that combines these theoretical perspectives.
From the efficiency perspective, the M-form has an
information-processing advantage relative to the large functional
enterprise (Ansoff and Brandenburg, 1971; Egelhoff , 1982) . In
the functional organization, the major subunits deal with
business functions such as engineering, production and sales.
General management occurs solely at the top most level and the
coordination of the functional subunits is one of its important
responsibilities (Chandler, 1956; Hill and Jones, 1989; Rumelt,
1974) . In contrast, the top level managers of the multi-
divisional form are not involved with routine functional
activities within these units. Due to the comprehensive nature
of the functional manager's role, the functional form is subject
to cumulative control loss and a transformation of strategic
formulation (Mintzberg, 1979) . Loss of control results from
serial reproduction loss as fragmentary or erroneous information
moves up, and instructions are inadequately operationalized as
they move down the hierarchy (Williamson, 1971) . In addition,
lower level managers may intentionally falsify information to
their advantage (Williamson, 1970) .
Strategy formulation may be altered as expansion of the
functional form ultimately overwhelms the ability of the top
level managers to provide corporate planning decisions and daily
coordination of operations (Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978;
Mintzberg, 1979) . The M-form is viewed from the efficiency
perspective as an institutional response to problems of
interdependence, subgoal pursuit and confounding of strategic and
operating decisions (Williamson, 1980)
.
In addition to efficiency explanations for the emergence of
the multidivisional organization, an explanation based on the
power of coalitions in the organization has been proposed
(Cyert & March, 1963) . The organization is viewed as a coalition
of interests and groups each attempting to obtain something from
the collectivity and each with its own objectives and preferences
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Coalitions within the organization
are engaged in an ongoing competition for scarce resources.
Palmer, et al. (1987) argue that the conflict between top manage-
ment and two types of external ownership interests, family and
financial institutions, may influence organizational choice.
Ultimately, the usefulness of these perspectives must be
determined empirically. The paper maintains the general view
that theoretical pluralism is a legitimate methodology which
increases empirical content. This view is gaining momentum in
philosophy (Goodman, 1978; Rorty, 1989), in economics (Boland,
1982; Caldwell, 1982; McCloskey, 1985) and in strategy research
(Bourgeois, 1984; Bowman, 1990; Huff, 1981; Jemison, 1981; Jick,
1979) . As Allison (1971) so convincingly demonstrated, there is
much to be gained by taking diverse theoretical perspectives as
alternative conceptual lenses that may well lead to different
inferences from the same data. If facts are determined by
theory, then theoretical pluralism is best seen as a method of
widening one's theoretical framework as empirical materials are
interpreted (Denzin, 1989) . Specifically, I suggest that the
multidivisional form of organization may be best understood by
incorporating economic, administrative and power perspectives
(Bettis and Prahalad, 1983; Dale, 1952; Greenwood, 1974;
Khandwalla, 1977)
.
THE RESEARCH MODEL: A CONTINGENCY MODEL OF THE M-FORM
The multidivisional model, depicted in Figure 1 below, is a
contingency model for predicting the likelihood of the adoption
of the multidivisional form of organization. In the model, I
analyze the effects of firm size, firm strategy (diversifica-
tion) , environmental uncertainty and coalitional power on
organizational choice, as suggested by Palmer et al. (1987) . I
posit that management has some discretion in the choice of
organizational form (Allen, 1979; Child, 1972).
Insert Figure 1 about here
A well-grounded theoretical perspective is that structure
follows strategy (Chandler, 1962) and that in particular the
multidivisional structure follows the strategy of diversification
(Channon, 1973; Chenhall, 1984; Didrichsen, 1972; Dyas and
Thanheiser, 1976; Pavan, 1976; Rumelt, 1974; Suzuki, 1980).
The strategy of diversification whether motivated by a
resource-based imperative (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; Werner-
felt, 1984) ; to obtain technological capability (Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Teece, 1982); for financial reasons (Bowman, 1980;
Dundas and Richardson, 1982; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Song,
1983), for managerial reasons (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Mueller,
1969) ; to achieve synergies (Ansoff , 1965; Baumol, Panzar and
Willig, 1982) ; to reduce dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978); to reduce transactions costs (Williamson, 1985); to
utilize slack capacity (Chandler, 1977) ; or to increase market
power (Scherer, 1980) leads to problems of accountability,
control, and coordination (Fouraker and Stopford, 1968; Franko,
1970; Pitts, 1977; Zannetos, 1965).
A diversity of product lines tend to overload the decision
process of centralized organizations (Galbraith, 1977; Galbraith
and Kazanjian, 1986; Vancil, 1978). The reorganization from the
functional to the M-form minimizes information overload problems.
The M-form of organization is characterized by the division of
firms into quasi-firms. Each quasi-firm is responsible for a
given product or geographic area and has its own sales, finance,
purchasing and manufacturing decisions; each is therefore self-
sufficient (Hennart, 1982) . The M-form structure constitutes a
near-decomposable system to mitigate bounded rationality
constraints (Simon, 1962). The total system of decisions are
factored into "loosely coupled" subsystems (Orton and Weick,
1990; Weick, 1976)
.
An ideal multidivisional involves the following: (1)
Identification of separate economic activities and in particular
a separation of strategic and operating functions; (2)
Constructing quasi-autonomous divisions where profitability is
observable and measurable; (3) Monitoring the efficiency of each
division by a specialized corporate staff; (4) Awarding
incentives to promote profit-seeking behavior; (5) Allocating
cash flows to high yield uses; (6) Performing strategic planning
(Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Williamson, 1975). Arguably, the
most important functions of the M-form are the creation of its
own miniature capital market to achieve an efficient allocation
of capital (Heflebower, 1960; Jones and Hill, 1988; Williamson,
1981), and the attenuation of bounded rationality and
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985)
.
The multidivisional form may also mitigate the agency
problem of the separation of ownership from control (Berle and
Means, 1932) since internal auditing and control systems
installed by the M-form overcome problems of asymmetric informa-
tion. Several studies support the M-form hypothesis that
multidivisionals, by lessening the problem of asymmetric inform-
ation between corporate, business, and functional units, increase
profitability (Armour and Teece, 1978; Burton and Obel, 1980,
1988; Hill, 1985; Hoskisson and Galbraith, 1985; Steer and Cable,
1978; Teece, 1981; Thompson, 1981). However, a few studies do
not support the M-form hypothesis (Cable and Dirrheimer, 1983;
Cable and Yosuki, 1985; Harris, 1983) , while others suggest a
contingency theory for the advantages of the M-form (Hill, 1988a;
Hill 1988b; Hill and Pickering, 1985; Hoskisson, 1987).
Hoskisson and Hitt (1987) suggest that even on theoretical
grounds, the M-form does not completely solve the agency problem
as the highly diversified multidivisional leads to a focus on
short-term profitability (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980; Loescher,
1984). This latter group of studies guestions whether the
multidivisional is an unequivocally superior organizational form.
If the contingency paradigm is correct (Galbraith, 1973;
Thompson, 1967) then the M-form needs to be linked with the
interactive effects of efficiency and power variables in
predicting (and prescribing) organizational form.
Efficiency Perspective
From the Chandler-Williamson efficiency perspective, I
consider a structural equation model (Palmer, et al., 1987) to
examine whether diversification increases the likelihood of the
adoption of the M-form (HI)
. Also, geographic dispersion is
expected to increase coordination and control problems, and
consequently is predicted to increase the likelihood of the
adoption of the M-form (Chandler, 1962) (H2) . Grinyer, Yasai-
Ardekani and Al-Bazzaz (1980) found this relationship positive
and statistically significant. A model which tests the separate
effects of diversification and geographic dispersion on
organizational form must also take into account the impact of an
increase in diversification increasing the geographic dispersion
of the enterprise (H3)
.
The generalizations of diversity - structure linkages must
be qualified by consideration of size. Self-contained product
divisions may be too small to have their own marketing, research,
or production department. Williamson (1975) argues that
increased size leads to the possibility of control loss within
the centralized organization and is an important variable in
determining organizational form. In contrast to Williamson's
theoretical perspective, Stopford and Wells (1972) argue that
absolute size by itself does not have a direct relationship with
(divisionalized) structure, that it is diversity that induces
divisionalization. Thus, the model needs to test the hypothesis
that increased size induces the adoption of the M-form structure
(H4) or whether an increase in size (capacity) leads to an
increase in diversity (H5) and/or geographic dispersion (H6)
which results in the M-form (Donaldson 1982, 1986, 1987).
Grinyer and Yasai-Ardekani (1981) found that size exerts a direct
causal influence towards adopting the M-form. However, Donaldson
(1982) found that the association between size and the use of the
M-form disappeared when industrial diversity is controlled in
partial correlations. In both Donaldson's study and our sample,
only Fortune 500 firms are considered so that the importance of
size may be under-estimated.
A major impediment to divisionalization is the existence of
a common technical system that cannot be segmented. Chandler
(1962) asserts a technological rationale for determining in which
industries one may find diversification and ultimately the
multidivisional form. Chandler (1962) found that industries
that did not accept the M-form structure were: [A] Copper and
Nickel; [B] Steel; [C] Aluminum; and [D] Materials {firms in
these industries we shall designate as METMAT}. Industries that
only partially accepted the M-form were: [A] Petroleum companies;
[B] Processors of agricultural products {PETAGR}. Industries
that widely accepted the M-form: [A] Electrical and Electronics;
[B] Power machinery and Automobiles; [C] Chemicals (ELMACHEM) .
An aluminum producer, despite large sales, a diversity of
customers and a variety of end products, may be forced to retain
a functional structure due to interdependence (Jones and Hill,
1988) and because it can only afford one smelter. Thus, it is
not surprising to find that the aluminum, copper, nickel and
steel industries have been among those which have been late to
adopt the M-form (Chandler, 19 62) . Technologies with low product
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applications (steel, metal industries) imply that the M-form will
not be adopted (H7) (Burton and Obel, 1980) and that diversifica-
tion and geographic dispersion will be low (H8 and H9) .
Conversely, technologies with an abundance of product
applications (electronics, chemicals, power machinery) imply
diversification and consequently the likelihood of the adoption
of the M-form is expected to be much higher than those industries
with moderate product applications, such as petroleum and
agricultural firms (Chandler, 1962) . Thus, it is predicted that
the petroleum and agricultural firms will also experience low
adoption of the M-form (H10) as well as low diversification (Hll)
and low geographic dispersion (H12)
.
It should be noted that in addition to the technological
rationale, Chandler also suggests that firms that follow the
strategy of vertical integration are less likely to adopt the M-
form. This strategy is pervasive in the cases of metal and
petroleum firms. Whether technology or strategy is the dominant
force in these cases is an identification problem which is still
open for empirical testing.
Coalitional Power Perspective
In addition to the economic explanations for the emergence
of the multidivisional form, an explanation based on the power of
coalitions in the organization has been articulated by Cyert and
March (1963) and by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) . A conflict may
develop between top management and two types of external
ownership interests (families and financial institutions) which
influences organizational choice. In particular the structural
equation model tested in this study, considers whether family-
dominated firms prefer centralized control of operations and
have a direct negative effect on the likelihood that firms choose
the M-form (H13) . Also, it is hypothesized that family-
dominated firms may not diversify (because it would dilute their
ownership and control over the firm) (H14) . Similarly, family-
dominated firms may have low geographic dispersion since it may
threaten their influence (H15) . Several case studies have
observed that family-dominated firms do not adopt the M-form
(Chandler 1962; Channon 1973; Pavan 1976). Furthermore, Channon
(1973) found that family-controlled companies proved to be less
diversified than non-family-controlled companies.
Palmer et al. (1987) hypothesized that institutionally-
dominated firms (defined below) will be slow to adopt the M-form
because the M-form threatens the demand for the economy-wide
investment information and expertise of financial institutions.
Since these financial institutions are in competition with the
large multidivisional ("a mini-bank") , the hypothesis is that
institutionally-dominated firms will imply a direct negative
effect on the M-form (H16) . Also, it is predicted that
institutionally-dominated firms are less diversified (H17) and
less geographically dispersed (H18)
,
and that these indirect
effects will also lead to a lower likelihood of the adoption of
the M-form.
Finally, concerning life-cycles of the organization, I test
whether older firms, due to structural inertia, have a direct
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negative effect on the adoption of the M-form (Fligstein, 1985;
Hannan and Freeman, 1984) (H19). On the other hand, older firms
may be larger and may pursue diversity (H2 0) and geographic
dispersion (H21) which would lead to an indirect positive effect
on the choice of the M-form (Chenhall, 1984)
.
METHOD
A sample of 325 of the 500 largest U.S. industrials in 1965
were selected and I classified the enterprise along functional or
multidivisional lines, using the guidelines of Williamson and
Bhargava (1972) . Missing data reduced the sample to 291 in all
analyses. The year 1965 was chosen because there were still a
significant number of functional organizations remaining in the
Fortune 500. Between 1966-1971, many of the remaining F-form
structures became M-form organizations (Bhargava, 1972,
Hoskisson, 1987) . This surge in the diffusion process warrants
closer scrutiny (Mahajan, Sharma, and Bettis, 1988; Teece,
1980)
.
In the sample 194 firms (2/3) were classified as
multidivisional and 97 firms (1/3) were classified as functional.
Of course, what I refer to in this paper as the multidivisional
form of organization is, in fact, a diverse family of institu-
tions consisting of several distinct types (Allen, 1978; Berg,
1965; Pitts, 1977; Williamson, 1975). I ignore these difficult
to measure distinctions because I am interested in modeling the
adoption of the multidivisional structure, not in the factors
that influence the implementation of various types of multi-
divisional forms (Hill and Pickering, 1986) . Seven previous
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works were used to validate the classifications (Armour and
Teece, 1978; Bhargava , 1972; Chandler, 1962; Harris, 1983;
Palmer, et al. (1987); Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1981).
Of the 291 firms in the sample, 139 were classified by-
Palmer et al. (1987) and 12 of the 139 (8.6%) were inconsistent
with my classification. Of the 291 firms, 173 were classified
by Rumelt (1974) and 10 of the 173 (5.8%) were inconsistent with
my classification. Consistency of classification of organiza-
tional form made independently by several researchers increases
validity and replicability (Montgomery, 1982)
.
Geographic dispersion is measured by three proxies: (1) The
number of geographically separate (non-adjacent) plants; (2) The
number of cities in which firm's plants operated; (3) The number
of states in which firm's plants operated. Data on the location
of each corporation's plants and on the industries in which they
produced were obtained from the Fortune 500 Plant and Product
Directory, 1966.
Due to the large sample size, I chose to utilize SIC-based
measures of diversification, rather than Rumelt' s classification
scheme. Montgomery (1982) found that the 2-digit, 3-digit, and
with one exception at the 4-digit level, SIC-based measures of
diversification (such as the Berry-Herf indahl index) increase
consistently with the strategy categories. Thus, there is a high
degree of correspondence between the continuous and categorical
measures. Montgomery noted that the Berry-Herfindahl measure is
particularly well suited for large sample cross-sectional
analysis. Diversification indices are simple, easy to compute,
objective, and replicable.
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Several SIC measures have been articulated in the
literature. The proxy used by Palmer et al. (1987) was a product
count measure. The analyses here will consider both product
count (Gort, 1962; Rhoades, 1973) and Berry (1975) measures of
diversification.
A drawback of the product count measure is that undue weight
is given to minor activities and the SIC classifications are
somewhat arbitrary. Merely counting product lines exaggerates
the overall significance of diversification since most firm's
product volume distributions are highly skewed, with a few
product lines accounting for the bulk of sales or employment
while numerous other lines are relatively small. A firm with 99
percent of its output accounted for by a single 4-digit product
is not diversified regardless of the number of 3-digit industries
represented by the remaining one percent. On the other hand, a
firm with its productive activity egually divided among four 3-
digit industries is likely to be "diversified", even if no more
than four 4-digit products are involved.
To correct for this drawback of the product count measure, I
also use the Berry index which corresponds to the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index:
hi
2
B = 1 ^
^
i
- $ < p . )
th
where P = ratio of the firm's output in the i industry to the
i
total output. This measure of diversification considers not
only the number of industries in which a firm is active, but also
13
the distribution of the firm's production activity among those
industries.
The Berry index takes on a value of for a specialized firm
acting in a single industry and approaches unity when a firm
produces equally in a large number of industries = (1 - 1/N)
,
where N= number of industries in which it is active. The index
is comparatively insensitive to minor secondary activities. The
empirical analysis considers the Berry-Herfindahl index across 2-
digits, 3-digits and 4-digits. The average Berry index for 1965
across 2-digits for my 291 firm sample was .406, the average
across 4-digits was .679.
The size of the sample firms is measured by four alter-
native proxies: (1) Sales; (2) Assets; (3) Invested Capital;
and (4) Employees. Corporate Age is measured by the number of
years (in decades) between 1965 and the year the firm was
incorporated. The year of incorporation was obtained from
Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks. The primary industry in
which each firm produced was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1977)
.
Burch's (1972) study of the largest 500 U.S. industrial
corporations in 1966 was used to measure dominance by family
coalition. Three categories suggested by McEachern (1975) were
used:
"Free of family influence" — if no identifiable group of related
people owned more than 4% of their stock;
"Family owned" (FOWN =1) — if more than 4% of their stock was
owned by group of related people, none of whom were inside board
members, otherwise FOWN=0;
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"Family owned and controlled" (FOAC =1) — if more than 4% of
their stock was owned by a group of related people, at least one
of whom was an inside board member, otherwise FOAC=0.
The U.S. Congress House Committee publication on Banking and
Currency, Pattman Subcommittee on Domestic Finance (1968) was
used to measure dominance by bank coalition. This volume lists
the amount of stock and number of board seats 49 large financial
institutions held in the largest 500 U.S. industrial corporations
in 1966:
If no bank or combination of banks owned at least 5% of a firm's
stock, it was considered "free of bank influence";
If more than 5% of a firm's stock was owned by a bank or group of
banks, but none of the board seats were held by representatives
of these institutions, the firm was considered "bank owned"
(IOWN = 1; otherwise)
;
If more than 5% of a firm's outstanding common and preferred
stock (with partial or full voting rights) was owned by a bank or
group of banks and one or more of its board seats was held by a
representative of this bank or group of banks the firm was
considered "bank owned and controlled" (IOAC =1; otherwise)
;
A summary of the variables used in the study is given in Table 1.
Table 2 gives details of the means, standard deviations, and
correlations for all the variables. There is no apparent
problem of multicollinearity , and the correlations give strong
indications that the hypotheses generated earlier are on target.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
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A TEST OF THE MULTIDIVISIONAL THEORY
The structural-equation model, depicted in Figure 1 and
elaborated below, requires that we make assumptions about
causality. Estimation of the model permits evaluation of the
magnitude of the relationships specified but does not allow
evaluation of the premises upon which the specification is based.
Assumptions about which variables cause other variables can only
be evaluated by analysis of longitudinal data, which I do not
have, or by disputation which constitutes the substance of the
theoretical discussion above. I submit that the structural-
equation model is well-grounded due to the theoretical
and empirical contributions of the many authors cited above.
Hypotheses were tested by estimating a system of structural
equations:
(1) MF = f [LNST, BDIV4, LNEMPL, METMAT, PETAGR, AGE, FOWN
FOAC, IOWN, IOAC ]
(2) LNST = f [BDIV4, LNEMPL, METMAT, PETAGR, AGE, FOWN
FOAC, IOWN, IOAC ]
(3) BDIV4 = f [LNEMPL, METMAT, PETAGR, AGE, FOWN, FOAC,
IOWN, IOAC ]
(See Table 1 above for variable definitions)
The second and third equations are estimated using ordinary-least
squares linear regression (Tables 4 and 5) . Because of the
binary dependent variable (MF =0, or MF =1), the logistic
response function is used to represent the impact of the effects
on the probability of becoming multidivisional in the first
16
equation (Table 3). The logit model allows the use of
categorical or discrete variables for both dependent and
independent variables (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Amemiya, 1981;
McFadden, 1974). Since the model contains qualitative
independent variables, logistic regression is chosen over
discriminant analysis (Press and Wilson, 1978) . Also, the
coefficient divided by its standard error is asymptotically
interpretable as a t-statistic (Domencich and McFadden, 1975)
.
The effect of the variables on the choice of organizational
form is expressed in two ways: (1) as increments in the log odds
that firms use the multidivisional form (logits) and (2) the
probabilities evaluated at the sample mean that firms adopt the
M-form, ^P's (Petersen, 1985). This logit equation and the two
ordinary least square equations are each estimated twice; first
with all of the variables untransformed (Model A) and second with
the continuous variables, both dependent and independent
standardized (Model B)
.
Estimation of Model A was used to assess the absolute
magnitude of the effects. Estimation of Model B is required to
determine the relative magnitude of the direct, indirect and
total effects that independent variables have on the likelihood
that the M-form is adopted. The Model B coefficients from the
first equation (both logits and ^P's) constitute the direct
effects. The indirect and total effects were calculated by
applying the multiplication rule, as specified in standard path
analysis (Duncan, 1975), to Model B's coefficients (Table 7).
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Letting X,X ,X ,... X =X
1J 2J 3J 10J J
stand for the 10 factors described above for subject J, we have:
10 10
P(MF = 1 | X ) = exp ( B + £ B X ) / 1 + exp ( B + £ B X
J J i=l i iJ i=l i iJ
where MF = { if the enterprise is not multidivisional
J 1 if the enterprise is multidivisional
P (MF = 1
I
X ) is the probability that a firm with company and
J J
market characteristics X uses a multidivisional structure.
J
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of the eguation yields
the linear relation between the factors and the logit or log odds
ratio:
LN[P(MF =l|x )/l-P (MF - 1 | X ) = B + £ B X
J J J J i=l i iJ
The coefficients were estimated by maximizing the likelihood
function:
J MFT 1-
L (MF 1 X ; B ) = £ P (MF = 1 \ X ) * (1- P (MF = 1 | X )
J J J=l J J J J
where N = the 291 firms on which the data have been collected.
A noteworthy feature of this model is that even though the
dependent variable is binary, the model's predictions are not.
Rather, the model's predictions are estimates of the probability
of taking on the value of 1 (rather than 0) . Maximization of
the likelihood function was accomplished with the Gauss-Newton
nonlinear least sguares method.
Insert Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here
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To test the hypothesis that the explanatory variables have no
impact on the probabilities P
,
that is, the
1
B = B = ... B12 10
the test statistic is -2 [ In 1 ( @ ) - In 1 (w) ]
where 1 ( @ ) is the value of the likelihood function evaluated
at the maximum likelihood estimates and 1 (w) is the maximum
value of the likelihood function under the hypothesis that
B =B =B =0. If the hypothesis is true, then asymp-
1 2 10
totically, the test statistic has a chi-square distribution with
(K-l) degrees of freedom (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl and
Lee, 1982) . From our logit regression, the value of the
test statistic is -2 (126.91 - 185.23) = 116.624. The chi-
square with 10 degrees of freedom at the one percent level of
significance equals 25.188, so that we can reject the hypothesis
that B=B =...B =0. A related summary measure
1 2 10
2 A
is the McFadden R computed as 1 - In 1 ( @ ) / In 1 (w)
= 1 - 126.91 / 185.23 = .31482. This measure has value zero
when B = B = . . . B =0 and value 1 when the model is a12 10
perfect predictor. This measure is analogous to the coefficient
2
of determination R in linear regression models.
19
RESULTS
As Table 6 below shows, the results support the economic
explanation of the M-form, as well as the political coalition
view.
Insert Table 6 about here
An increase in diversification, as measured by the Berry-
Herfindahl 4-digit index, significantly increases the likelihood
that the enterprises adopt the M-form ( ^P = .107) in support of
HI. The results were robust across the seven diversification
measures used. The results were also robust using probit
analysis.
Geographic dispersion, as measured by the log of the number
of states in which the enterprise had plants, significantly
(p <.01) increases the likelihood that the enterprises use the M-
form (&P = -154), supporting H2 . The results also hold when the
log of cities or the log of plants were used as proxies for
geographic dispersion. From the OLS regression (Table 4) we see
that diversification significantly (p < .01) increased geographic
dispersion in support of H3.
While Palmer et al. (1987) found a slightly negative
relationship between size (measured by the log of employees) and
the likelihood of the enterprises adopting the multidivisional
structure, in our study, an increase in size (LNEMPL) was
positively associated with the M-form, but did not increase the
likelihood of the M-form at a statistically significant level.
This would be consistent with the Stopford and Wells (1972)
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argument that diversification, rather than size per se, has an
influence on organizational form. This conclusion from the data
however is a tentative one. The result is not robust across size
measures (Kimberly, 1976) . When size is measured by the log of
assets for example, while all other regression results hold, the
size variable is positive and significant (p <.10), supporting
H4.
That an increase in size leads to an increase in the
likelihood of the M-form is suggested by Williamson (1975) and is
consistent with the empirical results of Grinyer and Yasai-
Ardekani (1981). Further empirical work is required to
determine the influence of size on organizational form. The OLS
equations indicate that increased size also induces increased
diversification (H5) and increased geographic dispersion (H6)
each at a statistically significant (p < .01) level. These
results were robust across size measures, dispersion measures and
diversification measures.
Consistent with Chandler (1962) , the industries associated
with high capital requirements and low technologically product
driven diversification were significantly less likely to adopt
the M-form. The logit analysis indicates that the metals and
materials firms were significantly (p <.05) less likely to adopt
the M-form (&P = -.302) which supports (H7) (Chandler, 1962).
The Palmer et al. (1987) study on the other hand, did not
support Chandler's findings that the metals and materials firms
were less likely to adopt the M-form. Besides using a Berry
diversification measure and a larger sample size, the discrepancy
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between their results and ours is partly due to the discrepancy
in the classification of M-form and F-form. For example, they
classified such firms as Kennecott Copper Corp. and Republic
Steel as multidivisional while several other independent
researchers have classified them as functional. The metals and
materials firms were neither less diversified nor less dispersed
geographically at a statistically significant level, leading us
to reject H8 and H9
.
The petroleum and agricultural firms (p <.01) were less
likely to utilize the M-form ( ^P = -.363) than the enterprises
whose primary industry was chemical, machinery, or electrical in
support of H10. The petroleum and agricultural firms were also
significantly (p < .01) less diversified in support of Hll but
they were significantly more geographically dispersed (p < .01)
than the chemical, electrical, and machinery firms, leading us to
reject H12
.
As stated earlier, the results also support the political
coalition view of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Those
firms that were family dominated (FOWN, FOAC) were significantly
(p <.10; p <.01) less likely to adopt the multidivisional
structure in support of H13 . The family-dominated firms FOWN
also diversified significantly less (p <.05) in support of H14 .
Family coalitions resist diversification because it threatens
their ownership and control. If diversification via acquisitions
is financed by debt, the power of banks in firms' long-run
decisions increase. If acquisitions are financed by issuing new
stock, then the holding of family members are diluted and outside
managers are required which reduces the power of family members.
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In contrast to the Palmer et al. (1987) study, our results
indicate no effect of family-dominance (FOWN, FOAC) on geographic
dispersion, leading us to reject H15.
Institutionally-dominated firms (IOWN, IOAC) were less
likely to adopt the M-form in support of H16. However, only the
IOWN enterprises were significantly (p <.10) less likely to adopt
the M-form. Palmer et al. (1987, p. 39) suggest a possible
rationale for this result:
Banks may not discourage firms from adopting the M-form as
vigorously when they own and control (as opposed to only
own) them, because they are in a position to insure that the
adoption of this form does not allow a firm to internalize
the capital market. By placing representatives on the board
(and perhaps the finance committee) , banks may be able to
control a firm's capital allocation process, when banks are
only the dominant stockholders in a firm, they may not be
able to exercise such influence on a regular basis.
There was no effect of institutional domination on
diversification in contradiction to H17. However, institu-
tionally owned and controlled firms were significantly (p <.05)
less dispersed geographically in support of H18 .
Little support was found for the organizational variant of
the ecological approach. Although AGE was negatively associated
with adoption of the M-form suggesting a structural inertia
effect, the effect was not statistically significant in contra-
diction to H19. However, in contrast to Palmer, et al.
(1987), the results indicated that a firm's increase in age leads
to a significant (p <.05) increase in diversification in support
of H2 0. On the other hand, the age of the enterprise had no
effect on geographic dispersion in contradiction to H21.
Finally, I consider the direct, indirect, and total effects
of variables (standardized if continuous) on the probability that
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firms will adopt the M-form (Table 7 below) . The coefficients for
Model B are reported in tables 3, 4 and 5. They indicate the
effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in a continuous
independent variable or a categorical change in a dichotomous
independent variable on the dependent variable in question.
These coefficients are used to calculate the direct, indirect and
total effects that a one standard deviation increase in an
independent variable has on the likelihood that a firm adopts the
M-form. These effects are expressed in probabilistic terms.
Insert Table 7 about here
Geographic dispersion, product diversification and size all
have a significant total effect on increasing the likelihood of
the adoption of the M-form of organization ( J^P's = .154; .159;
and .148 respectively). The primary industry also has a
significant impact on the likelihood of the adoption of the M-
form. On the other hand, the age of the firm has little total
effect on the adoption of the M-form ( (\ P =* -.007). Lastly,
family and institutional dominance have a significantly negative
total effect on the likelihood of the adoption of the M-form.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, I have analyzed a combined power and
efficiency model that considers traditional industrial economics
variables (such as the Berry-Herf indahl index and the influence
of the primary industry)
, and a coalitional view of the firm
(Cyert & March, 1963; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), where family-
dominance and bank dominance are important factors in explaining
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and predicting an enterprise's strategy and structure. The model
enables us to explain and predict organizational form.
Although some of the results were not consistent with
Palmer, et al. (1987) , the overall conclusion is that the model
proved quite robust to changes in sample and proxies, for this
time period. A question to be addressed in future research is:
How well does the model predict organizational form for later
(or earlier) time periods? The model presented stands up quite
well to the criteria of multiple connectedness and replicability
.
A well-grounded theoretical and empirical literature suggests
that the model is generalizable . Of course, this latter
assertion must be backed with the hard currency of further
empirical efforts.
A second extension of the paper would be to consider the
combined power and efficiency model to test the crucial role of
organizational form on profitability that has been somewhat
neglected in structure-strategy-performance models utilized by
industrial organization economists and strategic management
researchers (Caves, 1980) . That economists (with the exception
of Williamson, Teece, and a few others) have neglected
organizational form may be explained by their "black box" theory
of the firm, which suppresses organizational issues. Management
researchers should address this deficiency. The impact of
various organizational design decisions (not just M-form versus
functional form) on performance can, of course, be analyzed
within the industry structure-strategy-performance paradigm (Hay
and Morris, 1979; Scherer, 1980). Feedback effects of
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performance-strategy-organizational structure may be captured by
the use of simultaneous equation models.
A third issue, which is raised here, concerns the cogency of
the power perspective. Williamson (1985), for example, tends to
dismiss the power approach. In fact, the agency perspective
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) provides an
alternative efficiency explanation for the negative impact of
family and institutional dominance on diversification and the
likelihood of the adoption of the M-form. If we consider family
and institutional ownership as proxies for ownership
concentration, then when ownership is concentrated, the interests
of managers and owners are more closely aligned. Thus, the firm
is more likely to pursue profit-maximizing as opposed to growth-
maximizing (i.e. diversification) strategies. If one accepts
that much diversification is subject to diminishing returns, one
would expect a negative relationship between family and
institutional ownership and diversification for these reasons
(Hill and Snell, 1989).
Moreover, greater family and institutional control suggests
less problems associated with the separation of ownership and
control and consequently a lower need for the M-form structure.
Taking a pluralistic stance, I find merit in both the power and
efficiency (agency) perspectives. I am inclined to agree with
Eisenhardt's recommendation to resist reductionism and to utilize
multiple theories along with agency theory (1989, p. 71).
Finally, it is submitted that the multidivisional paradigm
illustrates the central premises of the paper: (1) a synthesis of
efficiency and power perspectives is a viable research program
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(Bettis & Prahalad, 1983; Ulrich & Barney, 1984); and (2)
theoretical pluralism increases empirical content (Denzin, 1989;
Rorty, 1979) and should be valued by those concerned with
progress in the emerging field of strategic management (Huff,
1981; Jemison, 1981; Mahoney, Tang and Thomas, 1990) . In fact,
it is submitted that the acceptance of the legitimacy of
theoretical pluralism is a scientific attitude that is unigue to
strategy research (Bourgeois, 1984; Bowman, 1990; Eisenhardt,
1989) and is a source of the discipline's growing vitality.
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TABLE 1
Summary of variables used in regressions presented
Variable
MF
LNST
BDIV4
LNEMPL
METMAT
Description
PETAGR
= 1 if firm is multidivisional
= if functional
Natural log of the number of
states that the enterprise had
plants (*)
Berry-Herf indahl 4-digit meas-
ure of diversification (**)
Natural log of the number of
employees of the enterprise
( ***)
= 1 if enterprise's primary
industry is in metals or
materials
= otherwise
= 1 if enterprise's primary
industry is in petroleum or
agriculture
= otherwise
FOWN
FOAC
Family-owned
Family-owned and controlled
(Defined in Methods section)
IOWN
IOAC
AGE
Institutionally-dominated firm
Institutionally-owned and
controlled
(Defined in Methods section)
(1965- Year of Incorporation) /10
* = two other measures of geographic dispersion used
** = six other diversification measures used
*** = three other size measures used
TABLE 2
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations
Mean SD 1234567 89]
1 MF .67 .47
2 LNST 2.18 .81 .39
3 BDIV4 .68 .24 .42 .41
4 LNEMPL 9.83 .97 .32 .39 .31
5 METMAT .15 .35 -.12 .01 -.06 -.04
6 PETAGR .22 .41 -.25 .10 -.32 -.16 -.22
7 AGE 5.78 2.26 .06 .19 .18 .21 .04 .05
8 FOWN .09 .29 -.09 .05 -.11 .03 .08 .01 -.02
9 FOAC .43 .50 -.25 -.15 -.09 -.23 -.01 .06 -.02 -.28
10 IOWN .09 .28 -.11 -.03 .01 .02 -.03 .03 -.06 .05 .10
11 IOAC .12 .35 -.06 -.09 .01 .09 .08 -.05 .01 -.07 -.01 -.]
Pearson product-moment correlations are used when both variables
are continuous. Spearman rank-order correlations are used when
at least one variable is categorical.
TABLE 3
Logit Regression Dependent Variable: MF
VARIABLE NAME ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT/
Model A * P
*
Model B * PB STANDARD ERROR
LNST 1.0158 .180 0.8268 .154 4.1099 ***
BDIV4 2.2345 .283 0.5385 .107 2.9832 **
LNEMPL 0.3495 .073 0.3373 .070 1.6469
METMAT -1.2479 -.302 -1.2479 -.302 -2.7125 **
PETAGR -1.5206 -.363 -1.5206 -.363 -3.6192 ***
AGE -0.0812 -.018 -0.1838 -.042 -1.1025
FOWN -1.0136 -.246 -1.0136 -.246 -1.7899 *
FOAC -1.0809 -.262 -1.0809 -.262 -3.1613 **
IOWN -0.8892 -.216 -0.8892 -.216 -2.0608 *
IOAC -0.6317 -.151 -1.1485 -.151 -1.1485
Constant -4.4476 -2.2570 -2.2536
* =(P <• 10) ** = (P <.05) *** = ( p <.01)
Log Likelihood (0) = -185.23
Log Likelihood Function = -126.91
2
McFadden R = .31482
2
Craig-Uhler R = .45859
The number of correct predictions from the model was 233. The
percentage of correct predictions then was 80.07 percent.
TABLE 4
OLS Regression
Variable Name
BDIV4
LNEMPL
METMAT
PETAGR
AGE
FOWN
FOAC
IOWN
IOAC
Constant
Dependent Variable LNST
Estimated Coefficient
Model A Model B
1.329
0.262
0.180
0.543
0.015
0.240
-0.093
-0.143
-0.365
-1.454
0.393
0.311
0.222
0.668
0.042
0.296
-0.114
-0.177
-0.448
-0.088
T Ratio
7.28 ***
5.74 ***
1.55
5.22 ***
0.84
1.64
-1.08
-1.24
-2.59 **
F value 16.2
R = .342 - (P <-10) ** = (P < -05) *** = (P < -01)
TABLE 5
OLS Regression
Variable Name
LNEMPL
METMAT
PETAGR
AGE
FOWN
FOAC
IOWN
IOAC
Constant
Dependent Variable BDIV4
Estimated Coefficient
Model A Model B
.056 .225
-.067 -.228
-.157 -.650
.015 .138
-.106 -.438
-.022 -.093
.026 .108
-.008 -.034
.103 .247
T Ratio
3.87 ***
-1.77
-4.80 ***
2.50 ***
-2.23 **
-0.80
0.69
-0.18
F value 8. 67
R = .198 * = (P <-10) ** = (P <-05) *** = (p < .01)
TABLE 6
MULTIDIVISIONAL MODEL
HYPOTHESIS RESULT
HI: Diversification induces the
adoption of the M-form
ACCEPT
(p<-05)
H2 : Geographic dispersion induces
the adoption of the M-form
ACCEPT
(p<.01)
H3 : Diversification increases
geographic dispersion
ACCEPT
(p<.01)
H4 : Increased size induces the
adoption of the M-form
REJECT
H5: Increased size leads to
an increase in diversification
ACCEPT
(p<.01)
H6: Increased size results in
an increase in geographic
dispersion
ACCEPT
(p<.01)
H7 : Technologies with low product
applications (Metals & Materials)
are less likely to adopt the
M-form
ACCEPT
(p<.05)
H8 : The Metal and Material firms are
less likely to be diversified
REJECT
H9 : The Metal and Material firms are
less likely to be geographically
dispersed
REJECT
H10: Technologies with high product
applications such as electronics,
chemicals and power machinery will
adopt the M-form with a higher prob-
ability than petroleum and agricul-
tural firms
ACCEPT
(p<.01)
Hll: Petroleum and agricultural firms are
less likely to be diversified
ACCEPT
(p<.01)
H12 : Petroleum and agricultural firms are
less likely to be geographically
dispersed
REJECT
H13: Family-dominated firms prefer cen-
tralized control and will have a
direct negative effect on the like-
lihood that firms choose the M-form
ACCEPT
FOWN (p<.10)
FOAC (p<.05)
H14: Family-owned firms may resist
diversification, which dilutes their
ownership and control over the firm
ACCEPT
FOWN (p<.10) only
H15: Family-dominated firms resist
geographic dispersion
REJECT
FOWN and FOAC
H16: Institutionally-dominated firms
will have a direct negative effect
on adoption of the M-form
ACCEPT
IOWN (p<.10) only
H17: Institutionally-dominated firms are
expected to be less diversified
REJECT
IOWN and IOAC
H18: Institutionally-dominated firms are
expected to be less geographically
dispersed
ACCEPT
IOAC (p<.10) only
H19: Older firms, due to structural in-
ertia, are expected to have a neg-
ative effect on the adoption of the
M-form
REJECT
H20: Older firms are expected to have
greater diversification
ACCEPT
(p<.01)
H21: Older firms pursue greater
geographic dispersion
REJECT
TABLE 7
DIRECT, INDIRECT AND TOTAL EFFECTS OF
VARIABLES (STANDARDIZED IF CONTINUOUS) ON
THE PROBABILITY THAT FIRMS WILL USE THE M-FORM
VARIABLE NAME
LNST
BDIV4
LNEMPL
METMAT
PETAGR
AGE
FOWN
FOAC
IOWN
IOAC
RECT INDIRECT TOTAL
154 .154
107 .019 .159
070 .092 .148
302 -.013 -.315
363 -.002 -.364
042 .033 -.007
246 -.031 -.278
262 -.040 -.304
216 -.012 -.229
151 -.094 -.250
NOTE 1: The direct effects are taken directly from Table 3.
NOTE 2: The figures in columns 1 and 2 do not sum to those in
column 3, because the direct and indirect effects of
variables are not additive when expressed in prob-
abilistic terms.
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